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ILLEGAL GOLD MINING IN PERU: 
A PUSH TOWARD FORMALIZATION?
Matthew Kleinhenz
Introduction
 Illegal gold mining in Peru is the driver 
of serious environmental and social issues and 
a root of corruption in Peru. In this article, I 
address the unsustainability of current illegal 
mining practices and ways in which Peru can 
make changes for the better of the country. 
Through analysis of the industry; the various 
social, environmental, and regulatory issues; 
and Peru’s current plans going forward, I 
recommend ways that Peru can move illegal 
gold mining to a safer and more formalized 
legal mining industry. 
 In the first section of this article I give an 
overview of Peruvian mining as a whole and its 
pivotal role in the country’s economy. I address 
the current regulation in the industry and 
highlight the process to becoming formalized. 
In the next section, I define and elaborate 
on illegal mining and the various issues 
surrounding it. I look at how mines operate 
without regulation and then discuss key 
environmental and social issues that arise from 
illegal mining. I then cover what is currently 
being done to prevent illegal mining in Peru 
through various incentives and plans set out by 
Peru’s new president, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski 
(PPK). I conclude by suggesting what can be 
done to promote and foster small-scale gold 
mining into a profitable, formal industry.
Mining Overview and Regulation
 Peru has seen a tremendous boost in GDP, 
growing 3.3 percent in 2015 and tripling in the 
last ten years. With decreasing poverty rates 
and a low inflation rate, Peru has one of the 
fastest growing economies in South America 
(World Bank). The main force behind this 
growth is Peru’s large commodity market, 
particularly in mining. As of 2015, Peru was 
the third largest producer of copper, trailing 
only Chile and China. In addition, Peru is the 
third largest producer of silver and the sixth 
largest producer of gold. Peru also holds large 
24
reserves of coal, iron, silver, tin, and zinc, all 
of which contribute to nearly 60 percent of the 
country’s total exports (“Peru Country…,” p. 
1). 
 In addition to economic growth, the 
mining industry in Peru is a major driver 
of government revenues. With mining 
accounting for 24 percent of foreign direct 
investment in the country, the government 
benefits from companies paying three kinds of 
taxes: a corporate income tax, a royalty tax, and 
a concession rights tax (“Peru Country…,” p. 
12). Peru has lined up 34 new mining projects 
worth $9.98 billion through 2019. These alone 
look to expand mining GDP by 24 percent and 
8.3 percent in 2016 and 2017, respectively 
(Emery).
 In Peru the mining industry is regulated 
by the mining laws enacted by the executive 
branch of the Peruvian government. The 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MINEM) 
ultimately regulates all mining activities in 
the country by approving the procedures 
to initiate mining activities, granting 
concessions to beneficiaries, and approving 
the environmental certification of projects. 
In addition to MINEM, two other entities also 
assist in the process of regulating a mine. The 
Geological Mining and Metallurgical Institute 
(INGEMMET) is responsible for informing 
the public regarding mining concessions, 
and the National Environmental Certification 
Service (SENACE) oversees the environmental 
certification of projects. Once these entities 
approve, operations can begin (Pickmann).
 One of the first steps toward operating 
a mine is the process of obtaining four 
different concessions from MINEM. The first 
concession allows activities such as exploration 
and extraction. The next is a beneficiation 
concession, which allows the holder the right 
to perform physical, chemical, and physical-
chemical activities to purify or refine metals 
and concentrate the minerals, ultimately 
creating a higher-valued product. A general 
labor concession allows the operator of a 
mine to perform auxiliary services, such as 
ventilation, drainage, and lifting or extraction. 
The final concession is for mining transport, 
which grants the owner the right to provide 
massive and continuous transport of mineral 
products through unconventional methods. 
To maintain these concessions, annual fees are 
paid and a minimum production obligation 
(MPO) must be met. The MPO requires holders 
to produce a minimum amount depending on 
the size of the mining operation. If this MPO is 
not met within 10 years, the holder is at risk of 
the concession expiring (Pickmann). 
 In addition to concessions, a social 
license is also required to operate a mine. A 
social license to operate (SLO) is “the level of 
acceptance or approval by local communities 
and stakeholders of mining companies and 
their operations” (“What Is the Social…”). As 
has been seen many times in Peru, the local, 
often indigenous, people oppose mining, 
which has led to protests and production 
stoppages. The SLO is considered one of the 
most important challenges facing the mining 
industry (Pantigoso et al., p. 37) because of 
the disputes that have arisen from various 
mining projects. With the large increase in 
mining in the past 15 years, there has been an 
equally large increase in conflict and violence 
surrounding large-scale mining operations. 
Protests occur when local communities do not 
want these operations negatively affecting the 
surrounding people and environment (Slack, 
p. 2). This in turn exemplifies the importance 
of having and maintaining a SLO. Concessions 
and SLOs are often the reason some miners 
prefer to mine illegally. 
Illegal Gold Mining
 Philippe Dozolme states that illegal gold 
mining is characterized by the absence of 
land rights, a mining license or permit, or 
any document that could legitimize the on-
going mining operations. Often illegal mining 
is synonymous with artisanal and small-scale 
gold mining (ASGM), broadly defined as illegal 
(informal in some countries) mining practiced 
by individuals, groups, or communities in 
developing nations (“What Is Artisanal…”). 
In Peru ASGM is often illegal, but in other 
countries it is considered legal. Some of the key 
features associated with illegal mining include 
the use of primitive technology and machinery, 
operation without legal concessions or without 
permissions from concession owners, and a 
lack of safety and health standards (“What Is 
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Artisanal…”). In a 2014 report, Hill estimated 
that nearly 28 percent of all gold mining in Peru 
is illegal. The individuals and groups running 
these operations are making billions of dollars 
from gold shipped to developed countries. In 
2014 it was estimated that 35 tons of illegal 
gold worth $1 billion made its way into the 
United States and Switzerland (Hill). 
 Over the past 30 years, illegal gold 
mining in Peru has grown significantly due 
to a global increase in gold prices and a lack 
of government regulation and enforcement. 
Specifically, in the Madre de Dios area of 
Peru, small illegal gold mines have exploited 
surrounding communities. The techniques 
used by the miners are not regulated and are 
performed with equipment that can be harmful 
to the environment. Also, a lack of government 
regulation has caused degradation of the 
environment and other social issues that I 
discuss below (Langeland, p. 1). 
Mercury Issues 
 There are many mercury issues that arise 
due to the methods used by the illegal miners. 
The miners use cheap equipment along 
exposed river banks or clear areas of forest to 
mine sediment below. Once the top layer of 
soil is removed, extraction of the layer of earth 
containing gold deposits begins. Then, the 
sediment and minerals must be separated from 
the gold. To amalgamate1 the gold particles, 
mercury is used (Langeland, p. 4). Once the 
mercury and gold have joined together, a ball 
of amalgam is formed and is then heated to 
evaporate the mercury, leaving a porous form 
of gold (Telmer and Stapper, p. 19). 
 Illegal gold mining has resulted in mercury 
contamination of the air, soil, and biota,2 posing 
a large risk to the environment and health of 
humans surrounding the mine. During the 
process the miners are touching the mercury 
and then also inhaling the fumes, often in 
their homes, with no protection (Langeland, p. 
11). Even after the process, mercury sticks to 
surrounding surfaces, and the wind blows the 
vapors around the surrounding community 
 1Amalgamation is the process of bringing gold particles 
in contact with mercury (“About Amalgamation…”).
 2Biota refers to the animals and plants in the 
surrounding region.
(Telmer and Stapper, p. 19). Once the mercury 
is burned off, it may be oxidized and deposited 
in local waterways. Approximately 20 percent 
of mercury used in the process of mining ends 
up in the aquatic ecosystem of the Amazon 
region (Langeland, p. 11). The inhabitants of 
this ecosystem build up mercury in tissue. As 
fish are poisoned by the mercury, people and 
various animals in the surrounding area are 
poisoned as well through their consumption of 
the fish. 
 In May 2016, the government declared a 
60-day public health emergency to address the 
mercury pollution along the Madre de Dios 
River. It has begun the process by assessing 
the harm that mercury has had on the local 
population. The government has estimated 
that the mercury pollution has affected 
48,000 people across 85,301 square kilometers 
(Fraser).
Social Issues 
 Environmental degradation from mercury 
is not the only issue surrounding the lack of 
regulation in the gold mining industry in 
Peru. Around the illegal mines in Madre de 
Dios, there are instances of forced labor and 
human trafficking by organized crime groups. 
As of 2012, nearly 500,000 people in Peru 
were dependent on illegal mining operations 
as a source of income. The operations consist 
of the actual mining and related services that 
were associated with illegal mining (“Risk 
Analysis…,” p. 18). As of 2016, the U.S. 
Department of Labor’s “List of Goods Produced 
by Child Labor or Forced Labor” included gold 
from Peru. The U.S. Department of Labor’s 
recognition of this problem indicates that 
these issues need to be addressed.
 The link between organized crime and 
illegal gold mining is strong. The sexual 
exploitation of women in mining camps is a 
major issue, with a case study performed by 
Livia Wagner and the Global Initiative Against 
Transnational Organized Crime revealing that 
as many as 1,000 girls are being exploited in 
the Madre de Dios area. In her report, Wagner 
includes a short anecdote from a miner relating 
that recruiters attract people of all ages through 
the promise of high wages working in areas 
surrounding the mining villages. Workers are 
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then transported into the mountains or rain 
forests where the illegal mines operate. On 
arrival, the workers’ identification cards are 
collected, and they are then forced to pay for 
their clothing, transportation, and lodging, 
which they were told earlier would be provided 
for them (Hill). If new workers cannot pay, they 
often sign contracts and take out loans from 
the controllers of the mines. The system is 
called habilitación-enganche, a debt bondage 
system by which capital is provided to these 
workers in exchange for their work (“Risk 
Analysis...,” p. 21). In addition to the debt 
bondage system, some younger workers must 
accept selling their virginity under harmful 
threats, called el pase. Wagner’s research also 
reported that every weekend, incoming female 
workers (and sometimes male), especially 
virgins, were auctioned off to the highest 
bidders. The miners often prefer and pay more 
for white girls who come from the coastal areas 
of Peru (Hill). This hints at the serious human 
trafficking issues that haunt the illegal mines 
in Peru. 
 The human trafficking issues surrounding 
the mines have been addressed and 
acknowledged by the government, yet the 
problem still exists, as girls as young as 12 are 
transported on boats or cars to mining sites 
(“Risk Analysis...,” p. 43). As stated earlier, these 
girls and women are attracted by false promises 
of jobs working in restaurants or shops around 
mines. It has been reported by Wagner that in 
the town of La Rinconada, Peru, where illegal 
gold mining is prominent, there are up to 2,000 
sex workers, 60 percent of whom are under the 
age of 18 (Wagner, p. 31). These workers are 
coaxed into thinking they will be working at 
mining camps but ultimately become slaves to 
the operators of the mine. 
Exports of Illegal Gold
 The government of Peru, in collaboration 
with its main export clients, has tried to crack 
down on the export of gold from illegal mines. 
Researchers in Peru have estimated that nearly 
20 percent of gold in Peru comes from these 
illegal mines. This 20 percent means that 
some of Peru’s biggest customers (United 
States, Canada, and Switzerland) are receiving 
gold that is mined with forced and child labor 
(Simoes and Hildalgo). Furthermore, because 
illegal gold miners do not report any of their 
earnings to the government, the government 
loses around $450 million in tax revenue (“Risk 
Analysis...,” p. 25). 
 The government has attempted to reduce 
the export of illegally produced gold. In 2010, 
a law was passed that prohibits the exporting 
of gold that lacks a receipt. The receipt is 
something that can only be obtained by legal 
mining companies (“Risk Analysis...,” p. 25). 
Nevertheless, the law has been ineffective due 
to the easily obtainable false receipts that are 
needed to turn illegal gold into legal gold. With 
these receipts, it is impossible to distinguish 
which gold is legal and illegal (Yagoub, 2014). 
In addition, researchers have found cases in 
which large, legal mining operations have 
exported over a billion dollars of illegally 
produced gold to Peru’s largest gold trading 
partner, Switzerland (“Risk Analysis...”, p. 26). 
Current and Future Initiatives
 The Peruvian government has made 
progress in combatting the environmental, 
tax, and laundering issues of illegal mining. 
PPK has voiced his concerns with the mining 
industry and has laid out some initiatives as of 
August 2016. However, PPK will be challenged 
to implement them as his party only holds 18 
of the 130 total congressional seats. 
 As of August 2016, many of the issues 
discussed in this article derive from bureaucratic 
incompetence, which has led to inefficient 
regulatory approval processes. In addition, 
widespread local community opposition has 
delayed extractives projects across Peru and 
threatened the country’s competitiveness 
(O’Connor and Ryan). As mentioned previously, 
the process to obtain and maintain legal 
mining rights and concessions is drawn-out 
and inefficient. It can take prospective miners 
a significant amount of time and money to 
obtain all the concessions to begin operating. 
Consulta previa (prior consultation) is a 
requirement that all companies obtain approval 
from indigenous communities to move forward 
with mining projects. In addition, there is a 
separate environmental check that must be 
completed. Often the environmental issues 
were already addressed in the consulta previa, 
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leading to a repetitious approval process. In 
addition to this inefficiency, there are others, 
such as the lack of interaction between local 
and national mining registries. This causes 
mining operations to have to register at 
least two times, once with the local registry 
and then again with the national registry 
(O’Connor and Ryan). This all stems from a 
shortage of qualified professionals willing to 
work for low salaries, from corruption, and 
from a lack of proper technology that could 
prevent information duplication (O’Connor 
and Ryan). The opportunity cost of lost profits 
alone would deter miners from becoming legal 
miners. With rudimentary equipment, illegal 
miners can start their operations more quickly 
and begin earning profits without having to 
deal with the many governmental regulations. 
 To address these various issues, PPK 
has stated that one of his goals is to create a 
quicker approval process for potential miners 
by streamlining the current system. PPK 
also plans on formalizing the illegal mining 
sector (O’Connor and Ryan). Currently, the 
government either ignores the issue or uses 
aggressive tactics when shutting down illegal 
mining operations. An “iron fist” policy was 
previously implemented, which consisted of 
the destruction of illegal mining equipment 
and operations and attacks on the individuals 
involved (Wang). Moving away from this policy 
and toward a hands-off approach, PPK wishes 
to incentivize the illegal miners to comply with 
government regulations and move into the 
legal mining sector, discussed later (O’Connor 
and Ryan). 
 In addition to incentivizing illegal miners, 
the central part of PPK’s formalization plan 
revolves around the creation of the Mining 
Promotion Bank (MPB), similar to a collection 
center that would receive minerals from small 
miners and pay out at a higher rate per gram of 
gold than selling illegally (“PPK’s Peru…,” p. 3). 
The MPB would also create trade associations 
to assist in the training of miners to ensure 
that safety and environmental regulations are 
adhered to. PPK claims that the banks would 
buy gold at 75 percent to 80 percent of the 
market price, which is higher than if sold in the 
illegal market. The plan also calls for a pension 
system for all miners and the implementation 
of a credit system that can be accessed through 
compliance with environmental regulations. 
PPK also suggests lowering sales and income 
taxes to assist in the transition of small mines, 
which is predicted to bring in around $305 
million of added tax revenue, all while reducing 
crime and protecting the environment 
(O’Connor and Ryan). 
 The final part of PPK’s plan is an oro 
limpio (clean gold) program, which he hopes 
will formalize at least 50 percent of the illegal 
gold miners by 2021 (“PPK’s Peru…,” p. 3). 
The program is essentially a promotion of 
small-scale mining through various initiatives, 
with the main goal of overcoming the various 
obstacles associated with formalization. This 
would involve local governments working and 
complying with the national government on 
the issues associated with formalization. The 
program also will help recover the severely 
environmentally degraded areas that have 
arisen from illegal mining. PPK’s plan will 
provide resources to local governments to assist 
them in the process of formalizing the mining 
operations in their areas. The government 
hopes to partner with the private sector and 
also with international firms to commercialize 
clean gold, mined through legal operations 
(“Plan de Gobierno,” p. 118). 
Incentives
 The government of Peru must exert 
stronger control over the entire mining 
industry to receive the benefits of formalization. 
While there are many negatives associated with 
illegal mining, these miners are often doing 
what is necessary to provide for their families. 
Many of these individuals have no other choice 
but to avoid formalization because of the lack 
of incentives to operate as a legal mine. The 
illegal miners are constantly shown the costs 
and lost profits associated with operating as a 
legal operation, rather than understanding the 
long-term environmental and economic gains 
that both individuals and the country would 
see. The first step toward formalization would 
be educating them about the incentives and 
benefits of operating within the regulations 
set forward by the government. A complete 
overhaul of the illegal mining industry would 
not meet the initial goals. An iron fist policy 
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would not incentivize illegal miners to formalize 
their operations; rather, it would further divide 
the illegal miners and government. PPK’s plan 
seems to move away from this policy, as he 
looks for a gradual formalization (O’Connor 
and Ryan). The small-scale mining industry 
is large in Peru and is something that should 
be harnessed and grown, not necessarily 
completely shut down. The illegal mining 
industry generates $1 billion to $3 billion per 
year and produced 20 percent of Peru’s gold in 
2015. This fact alone shows the importance of 
these small-scale operations (O’Connor and 
Ryan). 
 Through education of the illegal miners 
in Peru, the formalization process could be 
smoother. Operating an illegal mine can often 
be more expensive in some areas in comparison 
to a legal mine. For example, the cost of input 
materials will fall if bought legally. Aside from 
materials cost, the costs invested to become 
formal are quickly recovered as higher prices 
can be negotiated for final products. Another 
upside is that obtaining credit is significantly 
easier while operating as a formal mine. Illegal 
miners should be incentivized by these options 
and by the wage and labor benefits that would 
also increase (Koekkoek et al., p. 29).
The Importance  
of Small-scale Mining
 In many developing countries like Peru, 
ASGM has brought many positive benefits to 
small communities. For many of the miners, 
it is their only source of income. Not all 
these types of mines are considered illegal 
in other countries, even though the small 
projects are run in similar ways. This type 
of work is common in low-income areas of 
commodity-rich countries. Rather than the 
government shutting down illegal mines and 
driving out small-scale mining, it should help 
keep the small-scale mining industry alive 
through better regulation. The “Guidelines 
for Development of Small- and Medium-scale 
Mining” international seminar in February 
1993 asserted that small-scale mining 
operations make important contributions 
to national economies and provide for the 
economic stability of indigenous people in 
the areas surrounding the mines. Not only 
is this true but also ASGM can be a driver of 
entrepreneurial spirit in low-income areas 
(Hilson, p. 6). 
 Aside from employment, the promotion 
of small-scale mining operations and better 
regulations in Peru would help the country’s 
mineral markets. In some ways, small-scale 
mining is more financially viable than large-
scale operations. For example, Ghana has a 
strong ASGM industry, which the government 
has supported and promoted. To ensure that 
all mines receive fair prices for metals, the 
Ghanaian government invested $1.4 million 
to build regional buying stations that offered 
small-scale miners fair world prices for their 
gold. The result of these centers was a collection 
of over $140 million in revenues that would 
have been lost otherwise. By the early 1990s, 
these operations had contributed to over $70 
million in foreign exchange earnings to the 
government (Hilson, p. 7). Peru could benefit 
from establishing a more defined marketplace 
for these illegal mining operations to foster 
and grow. 
State Gold-buying Programs
 PPK’s MPB is a step in the right direction 
of a regional buying station. If Peru can mimic 
Ghana’s plan and deal with its challenges, this 
could be a key step in moving toward a more 
formalized and legal mining industry. Yet to be 
effective, state gold-buying programs (SGBPs) 
must be designed correctly. Ultimately, the 
three main goals of SGBPs are the collection 
of revenues, raising the current standards 
of ASGM, and reforming ASGM to enforce 
regulations in this sector (Garrett and Enslava, 
p. 3). A case study was conducted by RCS Global 
in 2015 that analyzed SBGPs in Côte d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, the Philippines, Bolivia, and Colombia. 
 The case study first addresses the 
challenges that surround SGBPs, with one 
of these the recurring problem of the lack of 
incentives to operate legally. This is an issue in 
Peru as well. SGBPs need to be the main market 
for selling gold for Peru’s illegal miners, or else 
these miners will find better prices elsewhere. 
While pricing is crucial, it is also important 
that too great a price incentive can cause 
gold to be smuggled into the country. Proper 
management of an SGBP is key to avoiding 
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conflict with surrounding countries (Garrett 
and Enslava, p. 3).
 For an SGBP to be successful, there 
are some initiatives that must be tackled by 
the government. One of the main initiatives 
in creating an SGBP is a gradual raise in 
standards and rules surrounding state-
bought gold (Garrett and Enslava, p. 4). The 
implementation of an SGBP must be eased into 
the illegal mining environment so miners can 
adapt at their own pace. By working closely with 
small-scale miners and building confidence in 
SGBPs, incentives would grow with the miners’ 
easing into the program. In addition, local 
support must be gained from the stakeholders 
in the community. If portions of the revenues 
are reinvested by the SGBP into the local 
community in which it operates, pressure is 
put on miners to sell to the SGBP instead of 
to other illegal buyers. Furthermore, for an 
SGBP to operate effectively, the government 
must implement a decentralized approach. 
The programs should be located in the areas 
directly surrounding the mining operations 
(Garrett and Enslava, p. 4). If the SGBP is not 
near the actual mine, it may further incentivize 
small-scale miners to sell their gold illegally to 
more accessible buyers. 
 Another factor for success is an effective 
taxation system. Taxes are what often lead 
miners to continue to operate in the illegal 
sector, where higher margins are made 
because taxes are not paid. Incentives need to 
be put in place, financial and non-financial, to 
encourage miners to use the SGBP. With local 
support, communities can encourage miners 
to sell to the programs, which in turn leads 
to tax payments. If the small-scale mining 
sector receives something tangible in return 
for taxes paid, such as equipment, training, 
or community stability, that will further 
incentivize miners to pay to the SGBP (Garrett 
and Enslava, p. 3). 
 Ultimately, the goals of PPK’s MPB can be 
accomplished with strong political backing, 
foreign support, and gradual implementation. 
By starting on the lowest scale possible, within 
communities, the illegal middlemen would be 
cut out, thereby allowing for a more gradual 
adjustment for current illegal miners. The 
implementation of a task force to run the 
banks in small communities would allow the 
government to keep out corruption. This 
decentralized approach would eventually lead 
to the growth of ASGM mining and an overall 
reduction in poverty (Garrett and Enslava, p. 
5). 
Assisting Small-scale Operations
 By recognizing the importance of its 
small-scale mining, Peru would very much 
benefit from assisting such operations. 
Current laws, however, make it challenging 
for ASGM miners to obtain equipment to assist 
in their operations. Large mining operations 
are free of restrictions on acquiring essential 
infrastructure to assist in their operations, 
whereas Peru has placed restrictions on ASGMs 
in order to limit illegal mining. Fernando 
Pickmann, in his article “Mining 2016: Peru,” 
says that small operations, whether operating 
legally or illegally, are prohibited from 
acquiring or using equipment such as dredges, 
front-loaders, and dumper trucks. It seems that 
this could further exacerbate the problem that 
Peru has with illegal mining. By preventing 
smaller mines from acquiring these assets, 
these mines are forced to use unconventional 
methods. If small mining operations cannot 
obtain the proper equipment, they then have 
less reason to operate as a legal operation, 
which has them operating outside the 
boundaries of government regulation. Not 
only is the government pushing away potential 
operations, which could contribute to small, 
low-income communities, but also it is 
assisting in the environmental degradation that 
is occurring. If the government were to open up 
these assets to smaller operations, there would 
be a greater incentive to be a legal entity, the 
government would have more control over the 
processes used in the extraction of minerals, 
and some of the health and safety issues could 
be eliminated. 
Conclusion
 Illegal gold mining in Peru has led to 
the death of humans and wildlife, destruction 
of habitats, and problems of forced labor. Yet 
these problems continue to be overlooked by 
much of the society and the government of 
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Peru. A push toward formalization is key to 
a more peaceful and richer country. Current 
government initiatives are having little effect 
on illegal gold miners, who are continually 
finding new ways to beat the system and avoid 
government regulation. In the commodity-
based economy of Peru, the current practices 
of gold mining could be detrimental to the 
entire country. 
 To avoid these problems, sustainable 
initiatives need to be put in in place. PPK 
has taken a step in the right direction, but 
SGBPs must be run in a way to incentivize 
sellers. Small-scale gold mining operations 
are the key to moving up the social ladder 
for many individuals, and that idea should be 
important in looking forward to what Peru can 
accomplish. By a gradual formalization process 
and with the support of small-scale miners, 
Peru can create a sustainable and lucrative 
gold mining environment. 
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